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Non-technical summary
The acquisition of ownership rights by a firm in its suppliers is a common feature in vari-
ous industries. Often, these acquisitions are reduced to a participation in the target’s cash
flow, and not associated with any control. This form of backwards integration has hereto-
fore not been of great concern to the researchers and practitioners of competition policy.
The consensus was that competition would not be harmed by such “silent” acquisitions.
Against this backdrop, we analyze how a non-controlling partial backwards acquisition
in the efficient supplier affects up- and downstream prices. When the efficient supplier also
sells to downstream rivals, the acquiring downstream firm internalizes that an increase in
the rivals’ sales increases upstream profits. Hence the acquiring downstream firm has an
incentive to increase its sales price as this increases rivals’ sales. Its rivals react by also
increasing theirs - and this the more, the more competitive the downstream industry is.
Full vertical integration, associated with controlling the target’s decisions, instead,
leads to decreasing downstream prices as double marginalization is avoided. It is shown to
be less profitable than passive backwards integration, as long as competition is sufficiently
intense in both, downstream and upstream markets. This has an important implication:
When acquiring shares in the upstream firm, downstream firms strategically abstain from
vertical control, and with this allow the efficient upstream firm to stick to a high transfer
price. This is a very peculiar form of the so-called strategic delegation of decisions.
With this paper, we show that passive partial backwards integration should indeed be
of concern to competition authorities.
Das Wichtigste in Kürze
Der Erwerb von Eigentumsrechten eines Unternehmens an seinen Zulieferern ist ein häufig
beobachtetes Phänomen. Er erfolgt oft, ohne dass damit eine Kontrolle der Entscheidun-
gen des Zulieferers einhergeht. Interessanterweise wurde bisher der Erwerb solcher nicht-
kontrollierender Anteile weder durch die Forschung noch durch die Wettbewerbsbehörden
einer näheren Betrachtung unterzogen. Man hat ihm keine wettbewerbsverzerrenden Kon-
sequenzen beigemessen.
In der vorliegenden Arbeit untersuchen wir daher die Wirkungen eines nicht kontrol-
lierenden Erwerbs von Anteilen am effizienten – und damit auch die Wettbewerber belie-
fernden – Zulieferer auf die Preisbildung im Zuliefer- wie auch im Absatzmarkt. Durch
die Anteile am Zulieferer berücksichtigt das nachgelagerte Unternehmen die Wirkung sei-
ner Preissetzung auf die Absatzmengen seiner Wettbewerber, da deren Mehrabsätze den
Zulieferergewinn steigern. Folglich kann das beteiligte Unternehmen seinen Absatzpreis
profitabel erhöhen, woraufhin die Wettbewerber nachziehen. Alle Preise steigen, und zwar
umso mehr, je intensiver der Wettbewerb im Absatzmarkt ist.
Kontrastierend dazu betrachten wir den Fall, in dem das nachgelagerte Unternehmen
seinen Zulieferer gänzlich erwirbt, also auch seine Preisbildung kontrolliert. In diesem Fall
verschwindet die in vertikal verflochtenen Unternehmen zu beobachtende doppelte Margi-
nalisierung und die Absatzpreise fallen. Trotz der damit verbundenen Effizienzsteigerung
ist diese gänzliche vertikale Integration für beide, das erwerbende wie auch das erworbene
Unternehmen, weniger profitabel als der Erwerb nicht-kontrollierender Anteile, sofern der
Wettbewerbsdruck auf beiden Marktstufen einigermaßen hoch ist.
Folglich wird das erwerbende Unternehmen die Anteile an seinem Lieferanten nur bis
zu dem Punkt erhöhen, oberhalb dessen es den Lieferanten kontrollieren würde. Dadurch,
dass der Erwerber auf Kontrolle verzichtet, erlaubt er dem Lieferanten sich auf hohe Zulie-
ferpreise festzulegen. Somit steigen bei einer nicht-kontrollierenden Rückwärtsbeteiligung
die Absatzpreise im Vergleich zu vollständiger Integration und Separation. Dies ist ein
besonders interessantes Beispiel für die strategische Delegation von Entscheidungen.
Insgesamt zeigen wir damit, dass die Akquisition von passiven Eigentumsrechten den
Wettbewerbsbehörden durchaus eine nähere Beobachtung wert sein sollte.
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1 Introduction
Passive ownership rights across firms, horizontal and even more so vertical ones, are very
common, but have traditionally not been of welfare concern, and thus of competition pol-
icy.1 While horizontal cross-shareholdings are a well-known strategy to anti-competitively
relax competition,2 the competitive effects of vertical ownership arrangements are more
controversial. Of prominent concern is foreclosure that restricts non-integrated firms’
supply, or their access to customers. While the classic Chicago challenge is that vertical
mergers are competitively neutral at worst (Bork, 1978; Posner, 1976), several arguments
are around of how vertical mergers can yield higher consumer prices, or even foreclosure.
The arguments rely on particular assumptions, such as additional commitment power of
the integrated firm (Ordover et al., 1990), secret contract offers (Hart and Tirole, 1990),
or costs of switching suppliers (Chen, 2001).3
In all these models, the authors compare allocations involving completely non-integrated
with those involving fully integrated firms, where integration involves a move from no con-
trol of the target firm’s instruments nor participation in its returns, to full control over
the instruments employed by the target firm and full ownership of its returns. Partial
ownership, either non-controlling or controlling, is not considered. Yet even hindsight
suggests that empirically, partial vertical ownership is the rule rather than the excep-
tion (see e.g. Allen and Phillips, 2000; Fee et al., 2006). However, there is very little
formal analysis on its competitive effects, and with it of the central question: Is passive
partial backwards integration really as innocent as believed heretofore, with respect to
anti-competitive effects such as increasing prices or foreclosure?
This is the question we address in the present paper. Our focus is on passive own-
ership interests that price setting downstream firms may hold in their suppliers, where
passive ownership involves pure cash flow rights, i.e. claims on the target’s profits, with-
out controlling its decisions. We consider a downstream market involving firms offering
horizontally differentiated products, and an upstream homogeneous product market with
firms producing at different levels of marginal costs. Under effective upstream competi-
tion, where the cost differences between the efficient and the other suppliers are not very
large, that supplier serves all downstream firms, but is restricted in its price setting by
the second efficient supplier.
While increasing passive downwards ownership of an upstream supplier in downstream
firms tends to reduce double marginalization and thus downstream prices, passive back-
wards ownership of downstream in upstream firms does not reduce, but exacerbate double
marginalization. The reasons are as follows: an increasing participation in the profits of
its upstream supplier leads the downstream firm to soften its reaction to an upstream price
increase. The upstream supplier incorporates this, and thus increases the upstream price.
1The topic has recently received more attention. In 2011, Joaquín Almunia, the EU commissioner for
competition policy, voiced that there is potentially an enforcement gap as the EU Merger Regulation does
not apply to minority shareholdings. See “Merger Regulation in the EU after 20 years”, co-presented by
the IBA Antitrust Committee and the European Commission, March 10, 2011.
2See Flath (1991) for an early analysis of the profitability of horizontal partial ownership, and more
recently Brito et al. (2010) or Karle et al. (2011).
3Other explanations include input choice specifications (Choi and Yi, 2000), two-part tariffs (Sandonis
and Fauli-Oller, 2006), exclusive dealing contracts (Chen and Riordan, 2007), only integrated upstream
firms (Bourreau et al., 2011) and information leakages (Allain et al., 2010).
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Whereas the two effects compensate each other, the acquiring firm, via its participation
in the efficient supplier’s profits, incorporates indirectly the effect of its own actions on
the downstream competitors’ sales quantities, as long as the downstream competitors are
served by the same efficient upstream firm. That downstream firm now has an incentive
to raise its price. In turn, strategic complementarity induces all downstream competitors
to increase theirs.4
We also show that the possibility to raise downstream prices incentivizes downstream
firms to acquire passive interests in the efficient upstream supplier. Thus, in equilibrium,
there will be backwards acquisition, as long as competition is sufficiently intense in both
markets. Also, in contrast to what one might expect, partial backwards acquisition by
one active firm does not invite the foreclosure of downstream competitors. Indeed, the
competitors benefit, via increasing equilibrium prices, from the acquiring firm’s decision.
This acquisition, however, takes place short of a level at which the downstream firm
takes control over the upstream target’s pricing decisions. If it did, the upstream firm
would lose its power to commit to high prices, and thus all downstream prices would de-
crease. Hence in the world analyzed here, backwards acquisitions have an anti-competitive
effect only if they are passive. In the extension section, we show that backwards acquisi-
tion is more profitable for the participating firms than full merger, and that all the effects
hold even when the upstream suppliers are allowed to charge two-part tariffs, that typi-
cally remove the double marginalization problem. In all, we claim that passive backwards
integration should indeed be of concern to competition authorities.
The present analysis is related to Chen (2001) who, in a similar setting, investigates
the effects of a full vertical merger. For such a merger to increase downstream prices,
the unintegrated downstream rival needs to incur costs of switching between upstream
suppliers. These switching costs allow the integrated firm to charge the downstream
competitor an input price higher than that charged by the next efficient upstream supplier.
We show that for all downstream prices to increase, neither full vertical integration
nor switching costs are necessary, nor does the input price charged to independent down-
stream firms need to increase. Indeed, partial backwards integration without the transfer
of control rights is effective in raising consumer prices when full integration is not, i.e.
when the Chicago argument about the efficiency increasing effect of vertical mergers does
hold. The reason is that with passive ownership, only profit claims are transferred to
downstream firms, but not control on upstream prices. In consequence, downstream firms
can acquire profit claims of suppliers to relax downstream competition.
Separating control from ownership in order to relax competition is the general theme
in the literature on strategic delegation. While that term was coined by Fershtman et
al. (1991), our result is most closely related to the earlier example provided by Bonanno
and Vickers (1988), where manufacturers maintain profit claims in their retailers through
4Flath (1989) shows that with successive Cournot oligopolies, constant elasticity demand and sym-
metric passive ownership, these two effects cancel out, so in his model, pure passive backwards integration
has no effect. Greenlee and Raskovich (2006) confirm this invariance result for equilibria involving an
upstream monopoly and symmetric downstream firms under competition in both, price and quantity.
These invariance results suggest that there is no need for competition policy to address passive vertical
ownership. By contrast, we show that the invariance property of downstream prices does not apply
within a more general industry structure involving upstream asymmetric Bertrand competition, where
the upstream firms are characterized by differing efficiency levels in production.
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two-part tariffs, but delegate the control over retail prices, in order to induce a softer
price setting of the competitor. In the present case, strategic delegation involves back-
wards oriented activities. The particular twist added to that literature is that the very
instrument firms used to acquire control is used short of implementing it.
The competition dampening effect identified in the present paper relies on internalizing
rivals’ sales through a common efficient supplier. This relates to the common agency
argument of Bernheim and Whinston (1985). Strategic complementarity is essential in
the sense that rivals need to respond with price increases to the raider’s incentive to
increase price. Indeed, acquiring passive vertical ownership is a fat cat strategy, in the
terms coined by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984).
A different kind of explanation for backward integration without control is that trans-
ferring residual profit rights can mitigate agency problems, for example when firm specific
investments are decided upon under incomplete information (Riordan, 1991; Dasgupta
and Tao, 2000). Güth et al. (2007) analyze a model of vertical cross share holding to
reduce informational asymmetries, and provide experimental evidence.5 While such po-
tentially desirable effects of partial vertical ownership should be taken into account within
competition policy considerations, we abstract from them for expositional clarity.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: We introduce the model in
Section 2. In Section 3, we solve and characterize the 3rd stage downstream pricing sub-
game. In Section 4, we solve for, and characterize the equilibrium upstream prices arising
in Stage 2. In Section 5, we analyze a key element involved in the solution to the first
stage of the game, namely the profitability of partial acquisitions. In the Extension Sec-
tion 6, we first compare the results derived in the baseline model with those derived under
full vertical integration. Second, we touch at the case in which upstream competition is
ineffective, so the efficient firm can exercise complete monopoly power.6 Third, we look at
the effects of bans on upstream price discrimination common to many competition policy
prescriptions. Fourth and fifth, we consider the effects of relaxing structural assumptions:
We replace sequential by simultaneous pricing decisions, and then allow the upstream
firms to charge two-part, rather than linear tariffs. The results remain unchanged. This
is surprising in particular, since two part tariffs are considered to remove inefficiencies due
to double marginalization. We conclude with Section 7. All relevant proofs are removed
to an appendix.
2 Model
Two symmetric downstream firms i, i ∈ {A.B} competing in prices pi produce and sell
imperfect substitutes obeying demands qi(pi, p−i) that satisfy
Assumption 1. ∞ > −∂qi(pi,p−i)
∂pi
> ∂qi(pi,p−i)
∂p−i
> 0 (product substitutability).
5Höﬄer and Kranz (2011a,b) investigate how to restructure former integrated network monopolists.
They find that passive ownership of the upstream bottleneck (legal unbundling) may be optimal in terms
of downstream prices, upstream investment incentives and prevention of foreclosure. However, a key
difference to our setting is that they keep upstream prices exogenous.
6In a companion paper (Hunold et al., 2011), we focus on ineffective competition and compare the
effects of passive and controlling partial backward and forward integration.
3
The production of one unit of downstream output requires one unit of a homogenous
input produced by two suppliers j ∈ {U, V } with marginal costs cj, who again compete
in prices. Assume that cU ≡ 0 and cV ≡ c > 0, so that firm U is more efficient than
firm V , and c quantifies the difference in marginal costs between U and its less efficient
competitor.7 All other production costs are normalized to zero. Upstream suppliers are
free to price discriminate between the downstream firms. Let xji denote the quantities
firm i buys from supplier j, and wji the associated linear unit price charged by supplier j.
Finally, let δji ∈ [0, δ¯], 0 < δ¯ ≤ 1, denote the ownership share downstream firm i acquires
in upstream firm j. Information is assumed to be perfect. The game has three stages:
1. Downstream firms A and B simultaneously acquire ownership shares δji of suppliers.
2. Suppliers simultaneously set sales prices wji .
3. Downstream firms simultaneously buy input quantities xji from suppliers, produce
quantities qji , and sell them at prices pi.
Underlying the sequencing is the assumption that ownership is less flexible than prices
are, and also easily observable by industry insiders. This is crucial as in the following we
employ subgame perfection to analyze how (pure cash flow) ownership affects prices. The
assumption that suppliers can commit to upstream prices before downstream prices are
set is inessential here.
Upstream supplier j’s profit is given by
pij =
∑
i∈{A,B}
(
wji − cj
)
xji . (1)
Downstream firm i’s profit, including the return from the shares held in upstream firms,
is
Πi = pi qi(pi, p−i) −
∑
j∈{U,V }
wji x
j
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
operational profit
+
∑
j∈{U,V }
δji pi
j,
︸ ︷︷ ︸
upstream profit shares
(2)
to be maximized with respect to its own price pi, subject to the constraint
∑
xji ≥ qi, so
that input purchases are sufficient to satisfy quantity demanded.
We use the term partial ownership for an ownership share strictly between zero and
one. We call passive an ownership share that does not involve control over the target
firm’s pricing strategy, and active one that does. The possibility to control the target’s
instruments is treated as independent of the ownership share in the target. With this
we want to avoid the discussion of at which level of shareholdings control arises. That
depends on institutional detail and the distribution of ownership share holdings in the
target firm. Although a restriction of δ¯ < 1/2 appears highly plausible for ownership to
be passive, our results on passive ownership hold for any δ¯ < 1. See O’Brien and Salop
(1999), as well as Hunold, Röller and Stahl (2011) for a discussion of this issue. Finally, we
define an allocation to involve effective (upstream) competition, if the efficient upstream
7The restriction to two downstream and two upstream firms is without loss of generality, as long as
the upstream firms can be ordered by degree of efficiency.
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firm is constrained in its pricing decision by its upstream competitor, i.e. can charge
effective unit input prices, as perceived by downstream firms, no higher than c.
An equilibrium in the third, downstream pricing stage is defined by downstream prices
p∗A and p∗B as functions of the upstream prices w
j
i and ownership shares δ
j
i , i ∈ {A, B}; j ∈
{U, V } held by the downstream in the upstream firms, subject to the condition that up-
stream supply satisfies downstream equilibrium quantities demanded. In order to char-
acterize that equilibrium, it is helpful to impose the following conditions on the profit
functions:
Assumption 2. ∂2Πi(pi, p−i)(∂pi)2 < 0 (concavity)
Assumption 3. ∂2Πi(pi, p−i)
∂pi∂p−i
> 0 (strategic complementarity)
Assumption 4. ∂2Πi(pi, p−i)
∂pi∂p−i
/∂
2Πi(pi, p−i)
∂pi∂pi
> ∂
2Π−i(p−i, pi)
∂p−i∂p−i
/∂
2Π−i(p−i, pi)
∂p−i∂pi
(stability)8
An equilibrium in the second, upstream pricing stage specifies prices wj∗i conditional
on ownership shares δji , i ∈ {A, B}; j ∈ {U, V }.
We sometimes wish to obtain closed form solutions for the complete game. Towards
those we use the linear demand specification
qi(pi, p−i) =
1
(1 + γ)
(
1− 1(1− γ) pi +
γ
(1− γ) p−i
)
, 0 < γ < 1, (3)
with γ quantifying the degree of substitutability between the downstream products. With
this demand specification, Assumptions 1 to 4 are satisfied.
3 Stage 3: Supplier choice and the determination of
downstream prices
Downstream firm i’s cost of buying a unit of input from supplier j in which it holds δji
shares is obtained by differentiating the downstream profit in (2) with respect to the input
quantity xji , i.e.
∂Πi
∂xji
= − wji︸︷︷︸
unit price
+ δji
(
wji − cj
)
.︸ ︷︷ ︸
upstream profit increase
Thus, the unit input price wji faced by downstream firm i is reduced by the contribution
of that purchase to supplier j’s profits. Call −∂Πi
∂xji
the effective input price downstream
firm i is confronted with when purchasing from firm j. The minimal effective input price
for downstream firm i is given by
wei ≡ min
{
wUi
(
1− δUi
)
, wVi
(
1− δVi
)
+ δVi c
}
. (4)
8The stability assumption implies that the best-reply function of i plotted in a (pi, p−i) diagram is
flatter than the best-reply function of −i for any p−i, implying that an intersection of the best reply
functions is unique.
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As natural in this context, firm i buys from the upstream supplier j offering the minimal
effective input price. If both suppliers charge the same effective input price, we assume
that i buys all inputs from the efficient supplier U as that supplier could slightly undercut
to make its offer strictly preferable. Let j(−i) denote the supplier j from which the other
downstream firm −i buys its inputs. Differentiating downstream profits with respect to
the own downstream price yields the two first order conditions
∂Πi
∂pi
= (pi − wei )
∂qi(pi, p−i)
∂pi
+ qi (pi, p−i) + δj(−i)i
(
w
j(−i)
−i − cj(−i)
) ∂q−i (p−i, pi)
∂pi
= 0,
i ∈ {A, B}. (5)
Observe that whenever δj(−i)i > 0, downstream firm i takes into account that changing
its sales price affects the upstream profits earned not only via sales quantities qi to itself,
but also via sales quantities q−i to its competitor.
By Assumptions 1-4, the equilibrium of the downstream pricing game is unique, stable
and fully characterized by the two first order conditions for given unit input prices and
ownership shares 0 ≤ δji ≤ δ¯. Note that strategic complementarity holds under the
assumption of product substitutability if margins are non-negative and ∂
2q−i
∂pi ∂p−i
is not
too negative (cf. Equation (5)). Also observe that if prices are strategic complements at
δA = δB = 0, then strategic complementarity continues to hold for small partial ownership
shares.
4 Stage 2: Determination of upstream prices under
passive partial ownership
V cannot profitably sell at a (linear) price below its marginal production cost c. U as the
more efficient supplier can profitably undercut V at any positive upstream price. This
implies that, in equilibrium, U supplies both downstream firms, and this at effective prices
at most as high as c.9 To simplify notation, let henceforth δi ≡ δUi and wi ≡ wUi . Let
p∗i (wi, w−i|δA, δB) denote the equilibrium prices of the downstream subgame as a function
of input prices. Formally, U ′s problem is
max
wA,wB
piU =
∑
i=A,B
wi qi
(
p∗i (wi, w−i|δA, δB), p∗−i(w−i, wi|δA, δB)
)
(6)
subject to the constraints wi(1 − δi) ≤ c, i ∈ {A, B} such that downstream firms are
willing to source from U . Differentiating the reduced-form profit in (6) with respect to
wi yields
dpiU
dwi
= qi(p∗i , p∗−i) + wi
dqi(p∗i , p∗−i)
dwi
+ w−i
dq−i(p∗−i, p∗i )
dwi
. (7)
Starting at wi = w−i = 0, it must be profit increasing for U to marginally increase
upstream prices, because both qi > 0 and q−i > 0. By continuity and boundedness of the
derivatives, this remains true for small positive upstream prices. Hence the constraints
9Another obvious implication is that none of the downstream firms has an interest in obtaining passive
shares from the unprofitable upstream firm V .
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are strictly binding for any partial ownership structure, so there is effective upstream
competition, if c is sufficiently small. In this case, equilibrium upstream prices are given
by
w∗i = c/(1− δi). (8)
We assume this regime to hold in the core part of the paper.10 In this regime, U ’s profits
are uniquely given by
piU = c(1− δA) qA(p
∗
A, p
∗
B) +
c
(1− δB) qB(p
∗
B, p
∗
A), (9)
and V ’s profits are zero. We summarize in
Lemma 1. The efficient upstream firm U supplies both downstream firms at any given
passive partial backwards ownership shares (δA, δB). Under effective competition, i.e. for
sufficiently small c, U charges prices w∗i = c/(1 − δi), i ∈ {A, B}, so that the effective
input prices are equal to the marginal cost c of the less efficient supplier V .
With these upstream prices, downstream profits reduce to
Πi = (pi − c) qi(pi, p−i) + δi c1− δ−i q−i(p−i, pi). (10)
Observe that if firm i holds shares in firm U so that δi > 0, its profit Πi, via its upstream
holding, increases in the quantity demanded of its rival’s product q−i. All else given, this
provides for an incentive to raise the price for its own product. Formally, firm i’s marginal
profit
∂Πi
∂pi
= qi(pi, p−i) + (pi − c) ∂qi
∂pi
+ δi
c
1− δ−i
∂q−i
∂pi
(11)
increases in δi. Also, if δi > 0, the marginal profit of i increases in δ−i, as this increases
the upstream margin earned on the product of −i. Finally, since ∂q−i
∂pi
increases when the
products (i,−i) become closer substitutes, the external effect internalized via the cash
flow right δi becomes stronger, and with it the effect on equilibrium prices. In all, this
yields the following central result:
Proposition 1. Let Assumptions 1-4 hold and upstream competition be effective. Then
(i) both equilibrium downstream prices p∗i and p∗−i increase in both δi and δ−i for any
non-controlling ownership structure
(ii) the increase is stronger when the downstream products are closer substitutes.
Corollary 1. Any increase in passive ownership in U by one or both downstream firms
is strictly anti-competitive.
Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 1 for the case δA > δB = 0. The solid line is
the inverted best-reply function prB(pA)−1 of B at a given δA > 0. The dashed line is
A′s best reply prA(pB) for δA = 0, and the dashed-dotted line above this is A′s best reply
10Clearly, if piU (wA, wB) is concave, both (one) of the constraints do(es) not bind for c sufficiently
large, in which case U can charge both (one) downstream firm(s) the unconstrained monopoly prices
below c.
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Figure 1: Best-reply functions of downstream firms A, B and the vertically integrated
unit UA for linear demand as in (3), with γ = 0.5 and c = 0.5.
for δA = 1. Hence, choosing δA amounts to choosing the best-reply function prA(pB) in
the subsequent pricing game. This becomes central when analyzing the profitability of
acquisitions in the next section.
5 Stage 1: Acquisition of shares by downstream firms
In this section, we assess the profitability of backward acquisitions in form of passive stakes
by downstream firms in upstream firms. We restrict our attention to the acquisition of
stakes in firm U . This is easily justifiable within the context of our model: Since both
downstream firms decide to acquire input from the more efficient firm, the less efficient firm
V does not earn positive profits in equilibrium. Hence, there is no scope for downstream
firms to acquire passive interests in V .
Rather than specifying how bargaining about ownership stakes takes place and condi-
tioning the outcome on the bargaining process, we determine the central incentive condi-
tion for backwards acquisitions to materialize, namely that there are gains from trading
claims to profits in U between that upstream firm and one of the downstream firms.
In order to enhance intuition, fix for the moment stakes held by firm B at δB = 0.
Gains from trading stakes between A and U arise if the the joint profit of A and U ,
ΠUA(δA|δB = 0) ≡ (1− δA)piU + ΠA = p∗A q∗A + c q∗B,
is higher at some δA ∈ (0, δ¯] than at δA = 0, where p∗A, q∗A and q∗B all are functions of δA.
The drastic simplification of this expression results from the obvious fact that a positive
δA just redistributes profits between A and U . The gains from trade between A and U
can thus arise only via indirect effects on prices and quantities induced by increases in
δA. Why should there be such gains from trade at all?
The vertical effects of an increase in δA between A and U are exactly compensating.
All that changes are A’s marginal profits. They increase, because with an increasing
δA an increasing share of U ’s sales to B is internalized. This leads A to increase pA,
which in turn induces B to increase pB. That price increase is not only profitable to B,
but eventually yields a net benefit to A and U . Intuition suggests that this competition
softening effect is profitable to the profits of U and i if competition is fierce, i.e. c is
sufficiently small. Indeed, evaluating dΠUA/dδA at small c yields
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Proposition 2. Increasing partial passive ownership stakes of firm i firm in firm U
increase the combined profits of i and U, if upstream competition is sufficiently intense.
This argument continues to hold for trades in upstream ownership shares involving
both downstream firms, under the obvious restriction that control is not transferred from
U to any one of the downstream firms.11
Corollary 2. Increasing partial passive ownership stakes of firms i and −i in firm U
increases the industry profit ΠUAB ≡ p∗Aq∗A + p∗Bq∗B, if upstream competition is sufficiently
intense.
Using the linear demand example introduced in (3), we can make explicit how our
case assumption that upstream competition is intense enough relates to the intensity of
downstream competition, and in addition derive optimal shareholdings by the downstream
firms. The joint profits of firms i and U are maximized at a positive passive ownership
share δi, given δ−i = 0, if c < γ2/4. Recall that a large γ corresponds to strong competition
downstream, and a small c to strong competition upstream. Hence if overall competition
is strong, it is profitable to acquire passive ownership as this increases downstream prices.
Since the upper bound monotonically increases in γ, the range of c in which this result
holds increases in γ. At any rate, under this condition, the ownership share maximizing
ΠUi is given by
δ∗i |δ−i=0 = min
(
4cγ(1 + γ) + γ2(2− γ − γ2)− 8c
4cγ(2− γ2) , δ¯
)
.
Since a firm’s backwards interests confer a positive externality on the second firm’s profits,
the industry profits p∗Aq∗A + p∗Bq∗B are maximized at positive passive ownership shares if
the less restrictive condition c < γ/2 holds.12 Under this condition, the industry profit is
maximized at
δ∗A = δ∗B = min
(
γ − 2c
γ − 2c+ 2cγ , δ¯
)
with the natural restriction that δ¯ ≤ 1/2.
6 Extensions
6.1 Effects of control
In this extension, we compare the effects of passive partial backwards integration with
those generated by full vertical integration (i.e. a vertical merger) between one of the
downstream firms, say A, and the efficient upstream firm U . We first consider full vertical
integration.
Let the ownership structure under vertical integration be described by {δA = 1, δB =
0}, and let A control U ′s pricing decisions. Since U is more efficient than V, the vertically
11In Subsection 6.1, we consider the effect of a transfer of control, and compare the outcome with the
present one.
12Observe that γ2/4 < γ/2. This indicates the internalization of the positive externality on the
downstream competitor when interests in the efficient upstream firm are acquired to maximize industry
profits .
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integrated firm continues to meet any positive price wVB charged by V . Under effective
upstream competition, it is again optimal to set wUB = c. By contrast, A, within the
vertically integrated firm, takes account of the true input cost normalized to zero.13
Consider now the effect of vertical integration on downstream prices. Still faced with
marginal input costs of c, vertical integration does not change the best response function
of B. However, vertical integration has two countervailing effects on the setting of pA.
Upward price pressure arises because the integrated unit fully internalizes the upstream
profit from selling to firm B, that is c qB(pB, pA). Conversely, downward price pressure
arises because double marginalization on product A is eliminated, as the downstream
costs, c qA(pA, pB) under separation, are decreased to zero. Indeed, it can be shown that
the downward pressure is stronger, yielding
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 1 to 4, a vertical merger between one downstream
firm and U decreases both downstream prices, as compared to complete separation.
As another consequence, observe that foreclosure does not arise under vertical inte-
gration.
Returning to Figure 1, note that for any δA > 0, the best response of the merged entity,
prUA(pB), represented by the dotted line in Figure 1, is located below the one arising under
separation.
Proposition 3 is also contained in Chen (2001). Yet for an anti-competitive increase
in downstream prices to occur in that model, Chen needs to assume that B has to make
supplier specific investments to buy from U , such that the integrated firm can set wUB > c,
and still continue to be the exclusive supplier of B. By contrast, as we state in Propo-
sition 1, downstream prices increase even without switching costs, once we allow for the
separation of profit claims and control of the target. Summarizing:
Corollary 3. Under Assumptions 1 to 4 and effective upstream competition, a vertical
merger between one of the downstream firms and the efficient upstream firm leads to a
decrease of all downstream prices when compared to those arising under vertical separation,
whence any passive partial backwards ownership of one or both downstream firms in the
efficient supplier U leads to an increase in all downstream prices.
We now turn to a comparison of the combined profits of A and U under full vertical
separation and full integration. By Proposition 3, vertical integration decreases both
downstream prices. This is not necessarily desirable for A and U when the overall margins
earned under vertical separation are below the industry profit maximizing level. In order
to assess whether separation increases the combined profits ΠUA, we ask the following
question: Starting at vertical separation, is it profitable to move towards integration?
Indeed, it can be shown that this is initially strictly unprofitable for c sufficiently small.
By continuity, there exists an interval (0, c¯] such that for any c in this interval vertical
separation is more profitable than integration. Hence
Lemma 2. Complete vertical separation of A and U is more profitable than a merger
between A and U if upstream competition is sufficiently intense.
13In line with the literature - examples are Bonanno and Vickers (1988) or Chen (2001) - we assume
here that under vertical integration, the upstream firm is unable to commit to an internal transfer price
to the vertically integrated downstream firm that is higher than its true marginal cost.
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Combining Proposition 2 and Lemma 2 yields
Corollary 4. Passive partial backwards integration of firm i into firm U leads to higher
profits than vertical integration, if upstream competition is sufficiently intense. Then,
downstream firms have the incentive to acquire maximal backwards interests, short of
controlling the upstream firm U.
As emphasized before, this result is nicely related to the literature on strategic dele-
gation. The particular twist here is that the very instrument intended to acquire control,
namely the acquisition of equity in the target firm, is employed short of controlling the
target. While this benefits the industry, it harms consumer welfare.
6.2 Ineffective competition
In the baseline model, we have emphasized the effects of passive partial backwards inte-
gration when there is effective upstream competition, as generated by a sufficiently small
difference c in marginal costs between the efficient firm U and the less efficient firm V
such that U was constrained by V . We now sketch the case where c is large such that U
can behave as an unconstrained upstream monopolist.
As before, an increase in δi, the passive backwards ownership share in the supplier,
softens the acquiring downstream firm i’s best response to increases in the input price, as
the effective input price decreases in δi. It also induces the acquiring downstream firm to
internalize its rivals’ sales which leads to an increase in the acquiring firm’s downstream
price. The first effect dominates, so that downstream prices decrease in δi for given
(nominal) input prices. As U is unconstrained, it can increase wi until its marginal
profits are zero again. With this, both effects of an increase in δi on downstream prices
are internalized through the upstream monopolist’s first order conditions.
For symmetric passive ownership by downstream firms, Greenlee and Raskovich (2006)
show that in this case upstream and downstream price adjustments exactly compensate, so
downstream prices stay the same independent of the magnitude of partial ownership and
the intensity of downstream competition. We can show that the incentive of a downstream
firm to passive backwards integration is lost if U can price discriminate. See Hunold et
al. (2011) for a further discussion.
By contrast, with effective upstream competition, only the first, marginal cost de-
creasing effect of an increase in δi is counterbalanced by the efficient upstream firm U ,
and that perfectly. Hence with effective upstream competition, the overall effect equals
the second effect of internalizing rivals’ sales, and thus both downstream prices increase
in δi.
6.3 Non-discriminatory upstream prices
Many competition laws require a firm to charge non-discriminatory prices. While by the
U.S. Robinson-Patman Act, non-discrimination is a widely applied rule, Article 102 of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union restricts the application of the rule
to dominant firms.
Clearly, under effective competition, symmetric passive ownership with δA = δB > 0
may arise as an equilibrium. Here, supplier U has no incentive to price discriminate.
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Yet, as we have shown in Proposition 1, symmetric passive ownership is clearly anti-
competitive, so in this case, a non-discrimination rule has no effect at all, and in particular
no pro-competitive effect.
Consider instead one of the firms’, say A’s, incentive to acquire a backwards interest
in firm U when non-discrimination is effective and δB = 0. Then U must charge a uniform
price c if it wants to serve both downstream firms. This yields profits to A of
ΠA = (pA − c) · qA + δA c · (qA + qB) .
Differentiating with respect to pA and δA yields
∂2ΠA
∂pA∂δA
= c ·
[
∂qA(pA, pB)
∂pA
+ ∂qB(pB, pA)
∂pA
]
. (12)
By Assumption 1, the own price effect dominates the cross price effect, and therefore the
cross derivative in (12) is negative if ∂qB(pB , pA)
∂pA
≤ ∂qA(pA, pB)
∂pB
. At δA = 0, the equality
pA = pB implies that ∂qB∂pA =
∂qA
∂pB
. Thus increasing δA decreases the marginal profit of
A. Hence, the best reply prA(pB|δA) and, in consequence, both equilibrium downstream
prices, decrease in δA at δA = 0. By continuity, this holds for small positive δA. This
result generalizes to all feasible δA as long as ∂qB∂pA ≤
∂qA
∂pB
for pA < pB, e.g. in case of
linear demand. Under this condition, if only one downstream firm has passive ownership
in U , and U optimally serves both downstream firms, then such ownership is not anti-
competitive under a non-discrimination rule.14
6.4 Simultaneous price setting
So far, we have assumed that upstream prices are set before downstream prices. Con-
sider now that all prices are set simultaneously. In this situation, upstream firms take
downstream prices as given. For U , increasing effective prices up to c does not affect
quantity. Hence, effective equilibrium upstream prices must be equal to c. However, with
simultaneous price setting, an equilibrium does only exist as long as the participation
constraints of downstream firms are not violated at effective upstream prices of c.
Lemma 3. Under effective competition, sequential and simultaneous setting of up- and
downstream prices are outcome equivalent.
Note that as long as the participation constraints of downstream firms do not bind,
the simultaneous price setting is equivalent to the case in which downstream prices are
set first, followed by upstream prices and, finally, downstream firms choose where to buy
inputs.
14U wants to serve both downstream firms for a small δi, given δ−i = 0. Once δi becomes large, U may
find it profitable to set a high nominal price at which only i wants to purchase. This makes −i dependent
on V . In turn, V can raise the price charged to −i above c, yielding partial foreclosure. However, it is
unclear whether partial foreclosure is an equilibrium. In a forthcoming paper, we will discuss in detail
the effects of non-discrimination rules in the different case situations.
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6.5 Two-part tariffs
The assumption of linear upstream prices is clearly restrictive, as argued already in Tirole
(1988). One is tempted to argue that if the upstream firms would be allowed to offer con-
tracts from a more general pricing regime, such as two part tariffs, double marginalization
would be removed, and with it the anti-competitive effect of passive partial backwards
integration discussed here. We show, however, that under vertical separation, as long as
competition is sufficiently strong, the efficient firm does optimally charge a linear tariff
even if a two-part tariff is admissible. This result extends naturally into passive backwards
ownership in the efficient supplier. Therefore, backwards ownership leads to increases in
downstream prices harming consumer welfare even when two-part tariffs are admitted.
We start from complete vertical separation, so δA = δB = 0, and maintain the as-
sumption that tariff offers are non-exclusive; that all contract offers are observable to all
downstream firms upon acceptance, and that acceptance decisions are observable when
downstream prices are set. A tariff offered by supplier j to downstream firm i is summa-
rized by {f ji , wji }, where f ji is the fixed fee downstream firm i has to pay the upstream
firm j upon acceptance of the contract, and wji continues to be the marginal input price.
Denote by pi∗i (w
j
i , w
k
−i), j, k ∈ {U, V } firm i’s reduced form downstream profits as a func-
tion of the marginal input price relevant for each downstream firm, but net of any fixed
payment. With the model constructed as in the main part of the paper, the Bertrand logic
still holds: U can still always profitably undercut any (undominated) offer by V , so in
equilibrium U exclusively supplies both downstream firms. Yet if upstream competition is
effective, U is restricted by V in its price setting. We require that V ’s offers, if accepted,
yield it non-negative profits.
It strikes us as helpful to consider the two extreme cases of downstream competition,
before moving to the relevant intermediate case. Let downstream firms’ demands first
be independent. In this case, there are no contracting externalities downstream, i.e. a
contract offer by j ∈ {U, V } to i has no effect on −i. Against the efficient supplier U ,
the best its competitor V can do is to offer the zero profit tariff (fVi , wVi ) that maximizes
the typical downstream firm i’s profit. This is tantamount to maximizing firm i’s profit
subject to the the constraint fVi = xi(pi(wVi ))(c− wVi ), where xi(pi(wVi )) is the quantity
procured by downstream firm i given the tariff proposed by upstream firm V .
Inserting V ’s zero profit constraint and equating input demand and supply, so xi = qi,
yields a profit to downstream firm i of (p∗i (wVi ) − wVi )qi(p∗i (wVi )) − fVi = (p∗i (wVi ) −
wVi )qi(p∗i (wVi ))− qi(p∗i (wVi ))(c−wVi ) = (p∗i (wVi )− c)qi(p∗i (wVi )). Since V wants to offer the
best possible alternative to the typical downstream firm, the unique maximizer of that
last expression is wVi = c. Hence the best offer V can make is {0, c}. In consequence,
if procuring from V , downstream firm i would obtain maximal profits pi∗i (c) = (p∗i (c) −
c)qi(p∗i (c)).
What is the best offer U can make against this? Suppose U would match V ’s offer by
setting {0, c}. Then U would leave downstream profits unchanged, and obtain piU(0, c) =
c qi(p∗i (c)) from firm i. Suppose alternatively that U would set wUi = wU−i = 0 implying
p∗i = p∗−i = pM ≡ arg maxp p qi(p, p), i.e. the monopoly prices that induce the industry
profit maximizing outcome. Then, in order to match the profits generated downstream
under V ’s offer, U must set fUi = p∗i (0)qi(p∗i (0))− (p∗i (c)− c)qi(p∗i (c)) > c qi(p∗i (c)). Hence
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U prefers to set {fUi , 0}, with fUi = p∗i (0)qi(p∗i (0)) − (p∗i (c) − c)qi(p∗i (c)). In this case
the tariff is “extremely nonlinear”, and U ’s profit opportunities are constrained by V ’s
downstream profit maximizing zero profit program, that induces downstream profits pi∗i (c)
per firm i. In a nutshell, when downstream demands are independent, U cannot do better
than removing double marginalization by setting the marginal price to zero, and absorbing
as much of the downstream firms’ profit as admitted by the outside option offered by V .
Let now downstream competition be perfect, such that when faced with equal input
prices, downstream firms make zero profits. Hence equilibrium downstream prices cannot
exceed c, the marginal costs which V can offer. For c < pM , it is optimal for U to offer
contracts with wUi ≤ c, wU−i ≥ c and fUi =
[
c− wUi
]
· [qA(c, c) + qB(c, c)]. This yields
piU = c [qA(c, c) + qB(c, c)] equal to the industry profit.
From all this, we expect that when downstream competition is away from, but close
to perfect, the efficient upstream supplier forfeits the possibility to charge a non-linear
price and sticks to the maximal linear one. More formally, for given contract offers of V
to firm A and B, U ’s problem is
max
fUA ,f
U
B ,w
U
A ,w
U
B
piU =
∑
i∈{A,B}
[
wUi qi + fUi
]
s.t. pi∗i
(
wUi , w
U
−i
)
− fUi ≥ pi∗i
(
wVi , w
U
−i
)
− fVi . (13)
U has to ensure that an individual deviation of each downstream firm to source from V is
not profitable. In equilibrium, the profit constraints of both downstream firms i ∈ {A,B}
must be binding, for otherwise U could profitably raise the respective fixed fee fUi , until
downstream firm i is indifferent between its and V ’s contract offer. Note that setting a
marginal input price wUi > c with fUi < 0 can not be an equilibrium. V could profitably
offer {fVi = 0, wVi ∈ (c, wUi )} and thus the downstream firm can accept the offer of U to
cash fUi and source at marginal costs of wVi . Finally, the equilibrium contract offers made
by V must be best replies to U ’s equilibrium contract offers. Together with strategic
complementarity of the downstream prices, this implies
Lemma 4. If U offers two-part tariffs with wUi ≤ c, i ∈ {A,B}, then {0, c} is V ’s unique
counteroffer that maximizes a downstream firm’s profits and yields V a non-negative profit.
Using these insights and letting wi ≡ wUi and fi ≡ fUi to simplify notation, U ′s
problem reduces to
max
wA,wB
piU =
∑
i∈{A,B}
[wiqi + pi∗i (wi, w−i)− pi∗i (c, w−i)] . (14)
subject to the no-arbitrage constraints wi ≤ c, i ∈ {A,B}.
Recalling the previous extreme examples with monopolies and perfect competition
downstream, one might expect that U ’s optimal contract offer is given by {0, c}, as long
as c satisfies p∗i (c, c) < pM , i.e. the resulting downstream prices are below the industry
profit maximizing level. However, lowering wi below c may increase U ’s profit even if
industry profits decrease. The rationale is that the outside option of downstream firm
i, i.e. the profit pi∗i (c, w−i) in case of a deviation to supplier V , tends to decline in i’s
resulting cost disadvantage c − w−i. This disadvantage increases as w−i decreases. In
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turn, U is able to extract more profits through the fixed payment from each downstream
firm.15
However, we can show that for c sufficiently small, this motive of devaluing the contract
partners’ outside options is dominated by the incentive to increase double marginalization,
yielding the result that upstream tariffs are endogenously linear. This is done in
Proposition 4. If upstream competition is sufficiently intense, then under vertical sep-
aration, {0, c} is the unique symmetric equilibrium two-part tariff offered by U to both
downstream firms.
As before, sufficient intensity of upstream competition is to be seen relative to the
intensity of downstream competition. In our linear demand example, it suffices to have
c < γ2/4. In passing, this is also the condition ensuring the profitability of an initial
increase of passive backwards ownership δi to i and U .
What does change if we allow for passive partial backwards integration? Nothing, we
claim. As {0, c} is a corner solution, (at least some) passive backwards integration does
not change the efficient upstream firm’s incentive to charge linear prices even if allowed
to charge non-linear ones. Hence
Corollary 5. If upstream competition is sufficiently intense, then also for passive back-
wards ownership, {0, c} is the unique symmetric equilibrium two-part tariff offered by U .
As contracts remain linear, Proposition 2 still applies and we obtain
Corollary 6. Even if two-part tariffs are allowed for, partial passive ownership of down-
stream firm i in supplier U increases bilateral profits ΠUA and industry profits ΠUAB com-
pared to complete separation, if upstream competition is sufficiently intense.
Hence the results derived in the main part of the paper for linear tariffs are upheld
even if observable two-part tariffs are allowed for and competition is sufficiently intense.
When competition is less intense, the tariffs are no more linear, as optimal marginal prices
are below c and thus the fixed fee is positive. Yet passive backwards ownership may still
be profitable. Calculations with our earlier linear demand example reveal that there exist
parameter ranges for which this is the case. A full analysis is beyond the scope of this
paper and left for future research.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we consider vertically related markets with differentiated, price setting
downstream firms, that produce with inputs from upstream firms supplying a homogenous
input at differing marginal costs. We analyze the effect of one or more downstream firms
holding passive, that is non-controlling ownership shares in the efficient, and therefore
common, supplier. In sharp contrast to related studies, we find that if competition is
sufficiently intense, passive ownership leads to increased downstream prices and thus is
strictly anti-competitive. Also, passive ownership is anti-competitive where a full vertical
15For a further discussion of this tradeoff see Sandonis and Fauli-Oller (2006) who focus on Cournot
competition with linear demand and do not consider partial ownership.
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merger would be pro-competitive. Confronted with the choice between passive backwards
integration and a full vertical merger, the firms prefer the former. Hence they voluntarily
abstain from controlling the upstream firm, because this would do away with its power to
commit to a high industry profit increasing price. The very instrument typically employed
to obtain control is used up to the point where control is not attained. This brings an
additional feature to the strategic delegation literature.
Our result is driven primarily by a realistic assumption on the upstream market struc-
ture, in which an efficient supplier faces less efficient competitors, allowing it to increase
upstream prices only when the price increasing effect is absorbed by the downstream
firm(s), via their claims on upstream cash flows. We show the result to be robust to
changes in other assumptions such as linear upstream prices, and sequential price setting
upstream and then downstream. Indeed, once allowing upstream firms to offer two-part
tariffs, we find that the equilibrium contracts are endogenously linear if competition is
sufficiently intense. Interestingly enough, under effective upstream competition, passive
ownership in suppliers tends not to be anti-competitive under a non-discrimination clause.
For competition policy, it is important to recognize that anti-competitive passive own-
ership in common suppliers is profitable when there is both up- and downstream competi-
tion and thus foreclosure potentially not the main concern. Most importantly, proposing
passive backwards ownership in a supplier as a remedy to a proposed vertical merger
tends not to benefit competition but eventually worsens the competitive outcome, as long
as upstream competition is effective and the upstream supplier serves competitors of the
raider. The reason is that full vertical integration tends to remove double marginalization
via joint control, whilst partial backwards integration tends to enhance that.
In the present setting, we abstract from other, potentially socially desirable motives for
partial backwards ownership. A particularly important effect is the mitigation of agency
problems in case of firm-specific investments (Riordan, 1991; Dasgupta and Tao, 2000)
such as investment in specific R&D. Indeed, Allen and Phillips (2000) show for a sample
of US companies that vertical partial ownership is positively correlated with a high R&D
intensity. Yet such potentially pro-competitive effects need to be weighed against the
anti-competitive effects of passive backwards integration presented here.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose for the moment that only downstream firm i holds shares
in U , i.e. δi > δ−i = 0. The first order condition ∂Π−i∂p−i = 0 implied by (11) and, hence, the
best-reply pr−i(pi) of −i is independent of δi. In contrast, the marginal profit ∂Πi∂pi increases
in i′s ownership share δi. This implies a higher best reply pri (p−i|δi) for any given p−i.
By continuity, ∂p
r
i (p−i|δi)
∂δi
> 0. Strategic complementarity of downstream prices implies
that an increase in δi increases both equilibrium prices. This argument straightforwardly
extends to the case where both firms hold shares in U because ∂2Πi
∂pi∂δ−i
≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. Differentiating the combined profits of A and U with respect to
δA and using that δB = 0 yields
dΠUA
dδA
=
(
p∗A
∂qA
∂pA
+ q∗A + c
∂qB
∂pA
)
dp∗A
dδA
+
(
p∗A
∂qA
∂pB
+ c ∂qB
∂pB
)
dp∗B
dδA
. (15)
Clearly, at c = 0, the derivative is equal to zero as dp∗i /dδA = 0 (the upstream margin is
zero). To assess the derivative for small, but positive c, further differentiate with respect
to c to obtain
d2ΠUA
dδAdc
= d
d c
(
p∗A
∂qA
∂pA
+ q∗A + c ∂qB∂pA
)
dp∗A
dδA
+ d
d c
(
p∗A
∂qA
∂pB
+ c ∂qB
∂pB
)
dp∗B
dδA
+
(
p∗A
∂qA
∂pA
+ q∗A + c ∂qB∂pA
)
d2p∗A
dδAdc
+
(
p∗A
∂qA
∂pB
+ c ∂qB
∂pB
)
d2p∗B
dδAdc
.
Evaluating this derivative at c = 0 yields
d2ΠUA
dδAdc
|c=0 = p∗A∂pBq∗A
d2p∗B
dδAdc
|c=0,
because dp
∗
A
dδA
|c=0 = dp
∗
B
dδA
|c=0 = 0 and pA ∂qA∂pA + qA = 0 (this is the FOC of piA with respect
to pA at c = 0). Recall that dp
∗
B
dδA
> 0 for c > 0 (Proposition 1) while dp
∗
B
dδA
= 0 at c = 0. By
continuity, this implies d
2p∗B
dδA dc
|c=0 > 0. It follows that d
2ΠUA
dδAdc
|c=0 > 0 which, by continuity,
establishes the result.
Proof of Proposition 3. The best response function of A under complete separation is
characterized by
∂ΠA
∂pA
= (pA − c) ∂qA
∂pA
+ qA(pA, pB) = 0. (16)
When maximizing the integrated profit pAqA + wBqB, it is - as argued before - still op-
timal to serve B at wB ≤ c and, hence, the corresponding downstream price reaction is
characterized by
pA
∂qA
∂pA
+ qA(pA, pB) + wB
∂qB
∂pA
= 0. (17)
Subtract the left hand side (lhs) of (16) from the lhs of (17) to obtain ∆ ≡ c ∂qA
∂pA
+
wB
∂qB
∂pA
.The symmetric fixed point under separation (δA = δB = 0) must have pA = pB.
This implies ∂qB
∂pA
= ∂qA
∂pB
. Hence, at equal prices, ∆ is negative as − ∂qA
∂pA
> ∂qA
∂pB
> 0 by
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Assumption 1 and wB ≤ c. A negative ∆ implies that the marginal profit of A under
integration is lower and thus the integrated A wants to set a lower pA. The best-reply
function of B is characterized by
∂ΠB
∂pB
= (pB − y) ∂qB
∂pB
+ qB(pB, pA) = 0 (18)
with y = c under separation and y = wB ≤ c under integration of A and U . Hence the best
reply function prB(pA) of B is (weakly) lower under integration. Taken together, strategic
complementarity (Assumption 3) implies that the unique fixed point of the downstream
prices under integration must lie strictly below that under separation.
Proof of Lemma 2. We look at the joint profit ΠUA of A and U when we move from
vertical separation to vertical integration. Recall that under effective competition, the
upstream firm, integrated or not, will always set the maximal input price w∗B = c
when selling to firm B, and this independently of any choice of wA. Also recall that
ΠUA = p∗A qA(p∗A, p∗B) + c qB(p∗B, p∗A). Let the equilibrium downstream prices as a function
of input prices be given by p∗A(wA, c) ≡ arg maxpA pA qA(pA, p∗B) + cqB −wA [qA + qB] and
p∗B(c, wA) ≡ arg maxpB (pB−c) qB(pB, p∗A). Note that wA = 0 yields the downstream prices
under integration, and wA = c those under separation.
The effect of an increase of wA on ΠUA is determined by implicit differentiation. This
yields
dΠU∗A
dwA
= dΠ
U∗
A
dp∗A
dp∗A
dwA
+ dΠ
U∗
A
dp∗B
dp∗B
dwA
.
First, Assumptions 1-4 imply that at wA = c and hence p∗A = p∗B, we have both
dp∗A
dwA
> 0
and dp
∗
B
dwA
> 0 for c ≥ 0. Second,
dΠU∗A
dp∗A
= qA(p∗A, p∗B) + (p∗A − c)
∂qA
∂pA︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+c
[
∂qA
∂pA
+ ∂qB
∂pA
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 at pA=pB
< 0,
but approaches 0 as c goes to zero. Third, dΠ
U∗
A
dp∗B
= p∗A ∂qA∂pB + c
∂qB
∂pB
is strictly positive for c
sufficiently close to zero. In consequence,
[
dΠU∗A
dp∗B
dp∗B
dwA
]
wA=c
> 0 dominates
[
dΠU∗A
dp∗A
dp∗A
dwA
]
wA=c
<
0 as c goes to zero. Summarizing, dΠ
U∗
A
dwA
|wA=c > 0 for c sufficiently small. By continuity,
decreasing wA from c to 0 decreases ΠU∗A for c sufficiently small which implies that moving
from separation to integration is strictly unprofitable.
Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose that firm −i sources only from U . The most attractive con-
tract that V can offer i must yield V zero profits, i.e. fVi = xVi · (c − wVi ), with xVi
denoting the quantity sourced by i from V . Given wUi ≤ c , the arbitrage possibility due
to multiple sourcing renders contracts with wVi > c and thus fVi < 0 unprofitable as xVi
would be 0. Recall that p∗i (wi, w−i) denotes the downstream equilibrium price of i as a
function of the marginal input prices. The net profit of i when buying all inputs from V
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is given by
Πi = (p∗i (wVi , wU−i)− wVi ) qi(p∗i (wVi , wU−i), p∗−i(wU−i, wVi ))− fVi .
Substituting for fVi using the zero profit condition of V with xVi = qi yields
Πi = (p∗i (wVi , wU−i)− c) qi(p∗i (wVi , wU−i), p∗−i(wU−i, wVi ).
Increasing wVi at wVi = c is profitable if dΠi/dwVi |wVi =c > 0. Differentiation yields
dΠi/dwVi =
dΠi
dp∗i
dp∗i
dwVi
+ dΠi
dp∗−i
dp∗−i
dwVi
.
Optimality of the downstream prices implies dΠi
dp∗i
= 0. Moreover, dp
∗
−i
dwVi
> 0 follows from
the strategic complementarity of downstream prices, and with it, the supermodularity
of the downstream pricing subgame. Finally, dpii
dp∗−i
> 0 follows directly from ∂qi
∂p−i
> 0
(substitutable products). Combining these statements yields
dΠi
dwVi
|wVi =c =
dΠi
dp∗−i
dp∗−i
dwVi
> 0.
This implies that raising wVi above c would be profitable for i. However, the no arbitrage
condition and wUi ≤ c renders this impossible. Analogously, decreasing wVi below c and
adjusting fVi to satisfy zero profits of V is not profitable for i. In consequence, the contract
offer of V most attractive to any downstream firm i is given by {0, c}.
Proof of Proposition 4. Recall that for marginal input prices of wi and w−i, i′s equilibrium
downstream price is given by p∗i (wi, w−i). Also recall that pi∗i (wi, w−i) ≡ [p∗i (wi, w−i)− wi] ·
qi
(
p∗i (wi, w−i), p∗−i(w−i, wi)
)
and substitute for pi∗i in (14) to obtain
piU =
∑
i
p∗i (wi, w−i) · qi
(
p∗i (wi, w−i), p∗−i(w−i, wi)
)
−∑
i
(p∗i (c, w−i)− c) qi
(
p∗i (c, w−i), p∗−i(w−i, c)
)
.
The first sum captures the industry profits and the second, as {0, c} is V ’s tariff that
maximizes the downstream firms’ profits, the value of each of the downstream firms’
outside option. An obvious candidate equilibrium tariff of U is {f ∗ = 0, w∗ = c} to
both downstream firms. This results in piU = 2c qi(p∗(c, c), p∗(c, c)). Let {f ∗, w∗} denote
alternative symmetric equilibrium candidates offered by U . Recall that w∗ > c with
f ∗ < 0 is not feasible, as then the downstream firms would source all quantities from V .
Towards assessing whether U would benefit from lowering w below c (and increasing f),
we differentiate piU with respect to w at and evaluate it at w = c. If that sign is positive
for wi, i ∈ {A,B} separately and jointly, then U has no incentive to decrease its price
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below c. Differentiation of piU with respect to wi yields
dpiU
dwi
= ∂p
∗
i
∂wi
qi + p∗i ·
(
∂qi
∂pi
∂p∗i
∂wi
+ ∂qi
∂p−i
∂p∗−i
∂wi
)
+ ∂p
∗
−i
∂wi
q−i + p∗−i ·
(
∂q−i
∂pi
∂p∗i
∂wi
+ ∂q−i
∂p−i
∂p∗−i
∂wi
)
− ∂p
∗
−i
∂wi
q−i −
(
p∗−i − c
)(∂q−i
∂p−i
∂p∗−i
∂wi
+ ∂q−i
∂pi
∂p∗i
∂wi
)
.
Evaluating the derivative at wi = c, subtracting and adding c ∂qi∂pi
∂p∗i
∂wi
, making use of down-
stream firm i’s FOC ∂pii
∂pi
= 0 and simplifying, we obtain
dpiU
dwi
= c[∂qi
∂pi
∂p∗i
∂wi
+ ∂q−i
∂p−i
∂p∗−i
∂wi
+ ∂q−i
∂pi
∂p∗i
∂wi
+ ∂qi
∂p−i
∂p∗−i
∂wi
] + [p∗i − c]
∂qi
∂p−i
∂p∗−i
∂wi
.
Substituting for p∗i − c from the FOC ∂pii∂pi = 0 yields that dpi
U
dwi
> 0 iff
c <
qi
−
(
∂qi
∂pi
+ ∂qi
∂p−i
) · ∂qi∂p−i− ∂qi
∂pi
·
∂p∗i
∂w−i
∂p∗i
∂wi
+ ∂p
∗
i
∂w−i
. (19)
The rhs of (19) remains positive as c goes to zero. Hence (19) holds for c sufficiently
small. This establishes the result.
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